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This eighth survey covers the legislative changes in our Workmen's
Compensation Act,' which were adopted by the 1969 session of the
Florida Legislature, and all related, reported judicial decisions since
publication of the last survey.2
Only two changes were effectuated by the 1969 Legislature. Under
the Governmental Reorganization Act of 1969,1 the Florida Industrial
Commission was placed under the Department of Commerce and its prior
functions assigned to the Division of Labor and Employment Opportun-
ities.4 The other legislative change was an increase in the salary of the
judges of industrial claims to an annual salary of $17,500.00.1
Sixty-seven judicial opinions were handed down by the Supreme
Court of Florida and the district courts of appeal during the period sur-
veyed. During the same period, an additional 218 orders of the full
Commission were brought to the Supreme Court of Florida by petition
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1969).
2. The last survey covered the 1967 session of the Florida Legislature and judicial
decisions reported from 167 So.2d up to and including 198 So.2d. This survey covers the
1969 legislative changes and those reported decisions beginning with 199 So.2d up to and
including 218 So.2d. For prior survey articles, see Burton, Florida Workmen's Compensa-
tion-1935-1950, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 74 (1950) (Florida survey); Clements, Workmen's Com-
pensation, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 469 (1954) (Florida survey); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation-
1954-1959, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 154 (1959) (Florida survey); Schroll, Workmen's Com-
pensation, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 216 (1961) (Florida survey); Schroll, Workmen's
Compensation, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 398 (1963) (Florida survey); Schroll, Workmen's
Compensation, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277 (1965) (Florida survey); Schroll, Workmen's
Compensation, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 608 (1967) (Florida survey).
3. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-106.
4. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-106 § 17(4).
5. FLA. STAT. § 440.45(3) (1967).
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for writ of certiorari which the court declined to grant.' The subject
matter covered by this survey will again be presented by topics rather
than by the chronological ordering of cases.
I. SPECIAL DISABILITY FUND
In the landmark and controlling decision of Stephens v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc.,7 the court was confronted with an opinion from the full
Commission which reversed an award of benefits to a claimant who had
sustained successive injuries. The full commission felt that the 1963
legislative amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act' had over-
come the court's prior decision of Sharer v. Hotel Corporation of Amer-
ica.9 In reviewing its prior decisions, as well as the legislative changes'
bearing upon the Special Disability Fund, the court adhered to its prior
decisions and found that the 1963 legislative changes were only a re-
arrangement of the pertinent provisions relating to the Special Disability
Fund. On rehearing, the court stated:
We decided two things in the decision toward which these
petitions for rehearing are directed: (1) That the apportion-
ment provision of Sec. 440.15(5)(c) and the reimbursement
provision of.Sec. 440.49(4) (c) are perfect equivalents and can
only be applied as alternatives; and (2) that the apportionment
provision of Sec. 440.15(5)(c), when applicable, requires that
there be apportioned out of the award for disability only the
amount of compensation for the percentage of disability result-
ing from the first injury that was still 'manifesting itself at the
time of the second injury and continuing to exist at the time
the award is made."'
In the Stephens decisions, the court considered the philosophy and
theory of workmen's compensation and stated that there seemed to be
no logical reason to treat preexisting disability resulting from injury
any differently than preexisting disability resulting from diseases or
other cogenital defects. Residual predisposition to reinjury was held not
to be subject to apportionment. The cause was remanded for determina-
tion of whether or not any of claimant's disability was apportionable
under the formula adopted by the court.
Two months after the opinion on rehearing in Stephens, the court
filed its opinion in the case of Davis v. Conger Life Insurance Co." In
6. The 1967 survey disclosed that 110 judicial opinions were handed down by the
Supreme Court of Florida and district courts of appeal; the supreme court denied certiorari
without an opinion in an additional 282 cases.
7. Stephens v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 201 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1967), modified on rehear-
ing, 201 So.2d 740 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Stephens].
8. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-235, amending FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5) (1961).
9. 144 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1962).
10. Stephens at 740.
11. 201 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1967).
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that case, the claimant sustained a back injury resulting in a 15-percent
disability of the body as a whole. Previously, he had sustained a heart
attack which was known to the employer and which caused limitations
upon his employment. He was found to have sustained a 25-percent
permanent, partial disability as a result of the preexisting heart attack.
In utilizing the provisions of the Special Disability Fund, the judge of
industrial claims found the claimant to be permanently and totally dis-
abled. On review, the full Commission reversed and held that the judge
erred in merging the two disabilities. It was contended before the
supreme court that the merger rationale of the Stephens case was not
applicable inasmuch as the injuries involved were not related, i.e., a
preexisting cardiac condition and a low back injury and, consequently,
no actual merger took place. In rejecting this argument, the court gave
the term "merger" a broader construction and stated:
Reinjury to a previously injured part of the body is not the
only way merger can occur. Merger can result from successive
injuries to separate parts of the body which have the com-
bined total effect of creating a greater degree of disability
to the body as a whole and a claimant's wage-earning capacity
than would have resulted from the last injury considered by
itself and not in conjunction with a previous injury. 12
The court went on to state that
[m]erger is not a condition that automatically arises upon
the mere occurrence of successive injuries which may or may
not have a combined disabling effect upon a claimant within the
contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation statute. It is a
condition, the finding and determination of which must be sup-
ported by competent substantial evidence in accord with logic
and reason. ...
The court found such evidence and quashed the full Commission's order.
In subsequent decisions, there were findings of merger between a
preexisting back injury and a new back injury 4 and of merger between
a preexisting eye disability and a new back disability.' 5
The factual question as to whether or not a preexisting disability
was manifesting itself at the time of the second injury and continued to
exist at the time the award was made was raised in Genereux v. Carib-
bean Concessions, Inc.'G In that case, the claimant had sustained a prior
back injury from which he never fully recovered. However, he was able to
return to gainful employment working part time as a parking lot atten-
dant and part time running cars from the parking lot to a hotel. While
12. Id. at 729.
13. Id. at 730.
14. Randall v. Wolfson & Diamond, 215 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1968).
15. Texaco, Inc. v. Special Disability Fund, 217 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1968).
16. 211 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968).
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so employed, he sustained the subject accident. After several months
of the five-percent functional impairment resulting from the second
his condition improved and he was discharged with 15- to 20-percent
functional impairment of the whole body.
The judge found the claimant to have a permanent, partial disability
of 20 percent of which 15 percent preexisted from the prior industrial
accident. He went on to find that the employer had knowledge of the
preexisting condition, that the five-percent increase in disability was
responsible for the loss of earning capacity, and that the major loss of
earning capacity was due to the second injury. The full Commission
reversed the judge and held the employer to be liable only for the effects
of examination and treatment for the injury resulting from the accident,
injury. In citing the Stephens decision that in every case involving suc-
cessive injuries there must be an expressed finding of apportionment, the
supreme court stated:
As applied to the present case, on remand the Judge of In-
dustrial Claims should make explicit findings as to what per-
centage, if any, of Claimant's permanent disability existing
after the second injury was manifesting itself in the form of a
loss of wage earning capacity at the time of the second injury
and at the time of the award. In this respect, the record find-
ings of 15 percent functional disability attributable to claimant's
pre-existing condition is not, by itself, competent substantial
evidence for concluding that a similar percentage reflects
Claimant's disability in loss of wage earning capacity manifest-
ing itself at the time of the second injury and at the time of
award. Neither should the Full Commission have suggested
that apportionment could be predicated on findings of func-
tional disability, as opposed to disability in the form of loss of
wage earning capacity attributable to claimant's pre-existing
condition.17
On remand of this case, the court held the claimant to be "entitled
to full compensation for whatever disability is found to exist after the
second injury. Depending on the express findings of apportionment, the
employer-carrier may be entitled to reimbursement for a part of the
compensation paid to the Claimant."'
II. APPORTIONMENT
In Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin,19 it was held that the
doctrine of apportionment was not applicable to temporary disability
benefits and medical benefits under the general scheme and intent of our
workmen's compensation law. Apportionment is also not applicable be-
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 3.
19. 210 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1968).
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tween successive employers and carriers where an injury by an accident
in the employ of a latter employer aggravates a condition remaining
from an earlier compensable injury." In those cases where there is no
evidence of any percentage of disability from a preexisting disease or
condition, judges of industrial claims may not utilize the doctrine of
apportionment. "1
Latent disc disease found to be asymptomatic prior to accidents
resulting in back injuries were held not to be apportionable, 2 as was a
preexisting arthritic condition which was not disabling prior to the
accident.28 In Direct Oil Corp. v. Coleman,24 the claimant was suffering
from an aneurysm, a preexisting, nondisabling congenital weakness. The
judge of industrial claims entered an award apportioning disability where
the uncontradicted medical evidence disclosed the preexisting aneurysm
was not independently producing any disability. On review, the award
was reversed based upon the court's prior decision in Evans v. Florida
Industrial Commission.25
In the case of Crotts v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 2 1 a workman
suffering from preexisting parkinson's disease was awarded permanent,
total disability for a back injury based upon the findings that the pre-
existing disease was not accelerated or aggravated by the injury but that
the disability was solely caused by the industrial injuries. In that case,
the preexisting disease prevented rehabilitation and corrective surgery.
In reinstating the award of permanent, total disability and denying
apportionment, the supreme court stated:
The statute does not provide for apportionment when a com-
pensable injury is aggravated by disease, but attempts only
to define the measure of apportionment when a compensable
disability is attributable in part to aggravation or acceleration
of pre-existing disease.
When the doctrine of apportionment is applicable in permanent,
total disability cases, the method of apportionment, as applied in Fisher
v. Carroll Daniel Fisher Construction Co.,2" is to apportion the com-
pensation rate rather than paying full benefits for a percentage of 350
weeks as in permanent, partial disability cases. In Fisher, the claimant
20. Lindsay v. Miami Shipbuilding Corp., 199 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1967).
21. Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin, 210 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1968). See also Lindsay
v. Miami Shipbuilding Corp., 199 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1967).
22. Robinette v. E. R. Jahna Indus., Inc., 208 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1968). In Zolobosky v.
Board of Pub. Instruction, 207 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1968), an award by the judge of industrial
claims which denied apportionment for a preexisting weakness due to age was also affirmed.
23. Holloway v. Curcie Bros., Inc., 203 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1967). In this case, the Court
remanded the cause to permit the employer the opportunity of demonstrating that there
was permanent disability due to the normal progress of the preexisting arthritis.
24. 216 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1968).
25. 196 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1967).
26. 208 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968).
27. Id. at 97.
28. 212 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1968).
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was suffering from a degenerative but asymptomatic spinal condition.
He then suffered a compensable accident and back injury which was
followed by three radical operations, prolonged hospitalization, prolonged
periods in body casts, intensive pain, and no evidence of intervening
accident. While in the hospital for the back injury, the claimant suffered
a conclusive seizure resulting in additional spinal fractures. He was
found to be permanently and totally disabled by the judge of industrial
claims, but the award was apportioned. The trial judge found that the
seizures were unrelated to the cause of 25 percent of the claimant's dis-
ability and that the preexisting asymptomatic spinal condition was the
cause of 10 percent of claimant's disability. He then awarded 65 percent
permanent, partial disability or 227.5 weeks of compensation. 9
The supreme court reversed. In addition to reversing because of the
improper method of apportioning permanent, total disability awards, the
court found that the trial judge had improperly apportioned the pre-
existing, asymptomatic spinal condition and further, found that a logical
cause for the seizures could be discovered in the accident and resulting
medical care, surgeries, hospitalizations, and pain which the claimant
suffered as a result of his accident. 80 The case was remanded to the trial
judge to give the employer-carrier the opportunity to show another cause
of the seizures which was more logical and consonant with reason.
Death benefits were also held to be subject to the doctrine of ap-
portionment during the survey period. In affirming the full Commission's
determination that death benefits must be apportioned between the pre-
existing diseases and the industrially related accident, our supreme court
stated in Tingle v. Board of County:
The statute makes no distinction between active and
quiescent pre-existing disease, and in view of the undisputed
evidence in this case that claimant's pre-existing disease was
accelerated by a compensable heart attack which would not
otherwise have caused his death, we think it is clear that the
law requires that compensation be limited to the extent of the
acceleration."-
Apportionment was held applicable to an accident resulting in
hearing loss where the affected ear was subject to being more easily in-
jured due to preexisting surgery.8" However, a case where a tendency
toward neurosis was held not apportionable by the judge of industrial
claims was affirmed in Holmes v. Glo-White, Inc..
8
29. Id. at 291.
30. Id. at 292.
31. 214 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1968).
32. Jim Rathmann Chevrolet Cadillac, Inc. v. Barnard, 200 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1967).
33. 207 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1968). In this case, a preexisting otosclerosis was apportioned
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III. HEART CASES
The decisions during the period surveyed relating to the compensa-
bility of heart cases are primarily concerned with the factual circum-
stances surrounding the heart attack rather than the law applicable
thereto. In Marhoefer v. Frye, an award of benefits was affirmed by the
supreme court which stated:
As in most of these heart cases the solution of the problem is
not an easy one, but we feel that the deputy commissioner
[judge of industrial claims] is in the best position to reach a
conclusion on the factual issue. When such conclusions of the
deputy are approved by the full commission, the petitioner here
necessarily carries a heavy burden. 84
In Wright v. Coral Farms,85 the full Commission reversed an award
of compensation. The reversal was based upon the fact that the claimant
suffered no pain at the time of the exertion. In reinstating the judge of
industrial claims' award of benefits, the court stated: "Granting that the
symptom of 'pain' be lacking, there is ample additional evidence in the
record to sustain the finding that Petitioner suffered a heart attack.""0
The court went on to point out that there was competent, sub-
stantial evidence by way of immediate symptoms other than pain
which followed the unusual exertion. A lack of competent, substantial
evidence to support unusual exertion resulted in a reversal of a judge of
industrial claims' award which had been affirmed by the full Commission
in Fort Lauderdale Transit Lines v. Bass.17 There, the claimant had been
a bus driver for nineteen years. He testified that on the day of his at-
tack, while he was operating a bus, he experienced difficulty in shifting
gears. Subsequently, he became dizzy or paralyzed, blacked out, and
drove the bus into a wall. The court found that there could be nothing
more common to a bus driver's employment than occasional difficulty
with shifting gears.
The requirement of a showing of unusual exertion bringing about
a heart attack need not be satisfied where the heart attack is the result
of an "accident." The heart condition is then treated like any other in-
jury and must be shown to be causally related to the compensable "ac-
cident."3
IV. DISABILITY BENEFITS
Little activity with regard to disability benefits has taken place
during the period surveyed. In Florida Favorite Fertilizer, Inc. v.
34. 199 So.2d 723, 724 (Fla. 1967).
35. 200 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1967).
36. Id. at 540.
37. 206 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1968). The opinion of the court in this case indicates its
skepticism regarding the history of the accident as given by the claimant.
38. Tingle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 214 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968).
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Womble,3" an award of permanent, total disability was reversed when
the medical evidence disclosed that the claimant was suffering from a
30-percent functional disability, that he could do light work, and that
if the claimant became unemployable because of pain, there was an
operation available which would decrease the pain. The hearing, which
resulted in an award of permanent, total disability, took place thirty-
one days after claimant's discharge by his former employer. The court
noted that the claimant had made no effort to secure light work which
he admitted he could perform and that an employment counselor was of
the opinion he could find a job for the claimant.
A permanent, partial disability award of 60 percent, based upon
injuries which resulted in a 20-percent, permanent, physical impairment
was affirmed in Everett v. South Florida Growers & Co.4 ° The order of
the trial judge was set forth in that opinion and disclosed, among other
things, that the claimant was 60-years old, possessed an eighth-grade
education, and could not return to his former employment or any other
work involving strenuous activity, prolonged standing, or prolonged
sitting in one position.
In the only hernia case decided by the court during this survey
period,41 the court reinstated an award of benefits which had been re-
versed by the full Commission. The full Commission's reversal of the
award was based upon the claimant's testimony that he did not notice
a lump until three weeks after the lifting injury. In reinstating the award,
the supreme court held that the hernia need not be visible immediately
after the accident in order to meet compensable standards.42
There can be no doubt that the statute requires some immedi-
ate manifestation of the hernia, but previous cases are in our
opinion entirely consistent with the above quoted rationale un-
der which the statutory requirement can be met by evidence of
immediate manifestations other than a visible lump.4"
V. MEDICAL BENEFITS
Although the cost of medical care obtained without authorization
of the employer or its workmen's compensation carrier is not assessable
against the employer or its workmen's compensation carrier, our supreme
court relieved the employee of such cost in two separate instances. In
Davis v. Conger Life Ins. Co.,4 4 a claimant, suffering from a heart con-
dition known to the employer, was involved in an accident resulting in
injury to his back. Through the physician who treated his back condi-
tion, the claimant obtained the services of a heart specialist without re-
39. 202 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1967).
40. 218 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1969).
41. Cost v. Texaco, Inc., 207 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1968).
42. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(6) (1967).
43. Cost v. Texaco, Inc., 207 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 1968).
44. 201 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1967).
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quest or authorization of the carrier. In affirming an order of the full
Commission, our supreme court held that "the consultation and treat-
ment by the heart specialist was reasonably secondary to the services
performed by the treating physician relating to the back injury.45
In Divito v. Fuller Brush Co.,4" the claimant, who was dissatisfied
with the treatment offered by the employer, was continually being
treated by a chiropractor. The employer had full knowledge of the treat-
ment from its inception and made no objection. The claimant had
returned to work shortly after the accident and had no permanent dis-
ability. The court stated that "questions of this type should be resolved
in such a manner as to afford adequate relief to the employee within the
spirit of the compensation act" and estopped the employer from ques-
tioning payment of the bill., 7
VI. COVER AGE
Only one decision concerning coverage of injuries was handed down
during the survey period. In El Sirocco Motor Inn, Inc. v. Prekop, the
claimant, an employee of a motel, suffered a broken arm as a result of a
fall in a vacant lot across the street from her employer's premises. 8 The
vacant lot was utilized by the claimant to park her vehicle. The judge
of industrial claims denied compensation. However, the ruling was re-
versed by the full Commission. In quashing, the full Commission's order
and reinstating the original denial of compensation our supreme court
noted that there was no evidence to support the Commission's finding
that the claimant was required to park in the vacant lot across the street
from her employer's place of business.4
VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND NOTICE
The time limits affecting the filing of claims were construed in two
separate cases. Stoner v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc.50 resolved the ques-
tion of when the time from which the period of 30-day notice begins to
run-injury or discovery of injury. The claimant had suffered from pre-
vious, chronic back disability and had no reason, either by the duration
or nature of physical symptoms suffered, to recognize the fact of current
injury. Medical attention and hospitalization did not become necessary
until ten days following the accident. Reversing the lower decision, the
45. Id. at 730.
46. 217 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1969).
47. Id. at 314.
48. 207 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1968). The opinion of the court in this case was not unanimous.
A dissenting opinion indicated that the employees were prohibited from parking on the
employer's premises, that the vacant lot was pointed out as the place to be used for their
parking, and that the vacant lot was the only available place within a reasonable distance
from the motel for the employees to park their cars.
49. Id. at 435.
50. 218 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1969).
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court held that the claim filed 30 days later was timely, stating: "[t]he
time limited does not begin to run until a reasonable prudent person
should recognize the fact of injury causally related to employment."'"
In B.F. Todd Electrical Contractors v. Hammond,5 2 an order had
been entered in 1958, adjudicating the claimant to have a 15-percent,
permanent, partial disability and awarding the benefits in a lump-sum
payment. Final compensation was paid in October 1959, and final medi-
cal payment was made without an award in August 1960. Several claims
for modification thereafter were ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecu-
tion, and in June 1962, another claim was filed. Although the order of
1958 awarding a lump sum was held a nullity in that the statutory law
at the time permitted only the full Commission to award lump sums of
compensation, the order was nevertheless valid insofar as determinative
of the claimant's degree of permanent disability. Thus, it was held that
the claim filed in June 1962 was not timely filed under the statute of
limitations insofar as the money benefits were concerned, but that it was
timely filed insofar as it made a claim for medical attention."
VIII. THE JUDGE OF INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS
The judge of industrial claims is the sole trier of fact, and his find-
ings, when supported by competent substantial evidence which accords
with logic and reason, are binding upon the full Commission and the
supreme court. 4 The judge of industrial claims must make adequate
findings of fact; and in every case involving successive injuries, there
must be expressed findings as to apportionability 5
The expertise which judges of industrial claims develop in evalu-
ating wage-earning capacity loss received comment in Eden Roc Hotel
v. Kearsch.5 In that case, the trial judge found the claimant to be suf-
fering from a 20-percent diminution of wage-earning capacity. The full
Commission reversed the award because the record did not reveal any
evidence concerning job opportunities available to the claimant. In re-
instating the trial judge's order, the supreme court stated:
In this case, no expert witness as to the labor market could
have done much better in evaluating what Claimant could earn
than the Judge of Industrial Claims, based on the testimony
before him. The 20% diminution of wage earning capacity
found by the Judge of Industrial Claims is an estimate that
51. Id. at 449.
52. 212 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1968).
53. Id. at 302.
54. Orendorff v. Refrigerated Trans., Inc., 216 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1968); Wright v. Coral
Farms, 200 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1967); Marhoefer v. Frye, 199 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1967).
55. For supreme court commentary regarding adequately drawn orders see Stephens;
Paul v. Toddle House Corp., 206 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1968); Jim Rathmann Chevrolet Cadilac,
Inc. v. Barnard, 200 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1967).
56. 218 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1969).
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Claimant, under her limited physical ability, could earn ap-
proximately $58 per week, since she had earned $72.50 per
week prior to her injury. We do not find that there was a mere
recitation of the factors set out in Ball v. Mann (Fla.) 75 So.2d
758. Instead, there was evidence of the Claimant's physical
limitations arising from the injury and the trier of facts was
able to transmute such evidence in terms of diminution of wage
earning capacity based on his common knowledge of the com-
munity labor market.5"
Judges of industrial claims may, in the absence of a showing ot
prejudice, permit additional testimony after a party has rested his case.58
Judges of industrial claims also have discretion to decide whether ad-
ditional examinations are needed in order to reconcile conflicting medical
testimony. However, the parties must be given the opportunity to cross-
examine the physician appointed by the trial judge.59
Once the judge of industrial claims has heard the case, he must
enter his order and release it prior to the time his commission expires.
His failure to do so has results in de novo hearings by his successor. 0
IX. THE FULL COMMISSION
In its role as an appellate review body, the full Commission must
adhere to the findings of fact made by the judge of industrial claims. It
is not authorized to reweigh the evidence or make findings contrary to
those made at the trial level.6 '
The record for review before the full Commission is limited by
Florida Statutes section 440.25(4)(d). The purpose of the statute in
restricting the Commission's review of the matter before it to the cer-
tified record is to prevent the reviewing authority from obtaining evi-
dence from outside the record. 2 Technical adherence to the statute was
held to be error in Crawford v. Farm Stores Processing, Inc., 8 when
the full Commission did not include a deposition of a physician as part
of the record. The trial judge considered it as evidence and obviously
intended to incorporate it in his second certificate of transcript. The
court noted that if the Commission had any doubts as to whether the
deposition was incorporated, it should have checked with the trial judge.
57. Id. at 753-54.
58. Id. at 754.
59. North West Trailer Sales v. McCann, 217 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1968).
60. Dominguez v. Aerodex, 203 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1967). The dissenting opinion in this
case indicated that the better procedure would have been for the full Commission to
designate the original judge as deputy pro hac vice for the purpose of entering a new order.
61. Milholin v. Pappas Restaurant, 217 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1969) ; Orendorff v. Refrigerated
Trans., Inc., 216 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1968) ; Acro Supply Int'l, Inc. v. Gallardo, 213 So.2d 429
(Fla. 1968) ; Pitt v. Ronnis Olmstead, Inc., 213 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1968).
62. Finkley v. John Raffa Lathing, 120 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1960).
63. 218 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1969).
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X. REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT
Judicial review of Industrial Commission orders has not changed
since the last survey. The court has, however, sought to discourage un-
necessary motions where briefs on the merits would accomplish the same
result.64
XI. MODIFICATION
The rules governing the acceptability and weight of evidence in the
initial claim proceedings are equally applicable to a modification pro-
ceeding. The burden of proof, necessary to establish a change, rests upon
the claimant. 5 Changes of condition may be based on a deterioration of
the claimant's physical condition as well as on changes of a psychiatric
or psychological nature.6"
In orders granting modification, the judge of industrial claims may
designate a prior date from which the modifying order should be effec-
tive. However, if he fails to specify a beginning date for the payment of
the modified compensation, payment begins from the date of the modify-
ing award.67
XII. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Recovery of benefits by an attorney representing a claimant entitles
the attorney to an attorney's fee payable by the employer or its work-
men's compensation carrier."8 The recovery of interest on a claimant's
award justifies assessment of additional attorney's fees.69
The method for determining the amount of an attorney's fees was
again stated in the case of Anchor Products, Inc. v. Rapo.70 In that case,
there was a stipulation permitting the judge of industrial claims to de-
termine a reasonable attorney's fee without the necessity of expert tes-
timony. In quashing the order of the full Commission which approved
the award of fees, the court set forth three permissible methods for
determining the reasonable value of fees:
(1) In the absence of a stipulation appropriate evidence
must be introduced regarding the amount of a reasonable fee.
Florida Silica Sand Co. v. Parker (Fla. 1960), 118 So.2d 2.
(2) A stipulation fixing a specific dollar amount of the fee
will be recognized and held binding without the necessity of
supplemental evidence.
64. Board of Conservation v. Sanders, 214 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1968).
65. Fred Howland, Inc. v. Rutkauskas, 216 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1968).
66. Milholin v. Pappas Restaurant, 217 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1969).
67. Sierra v. Deauville Operating Co., 213 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1968).
68. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (1967); Williams v. Lee, 213 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1968); Ford
v. Cunningham-Limp Co., 203 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1967).
69. Stone v. Jeffers, 208 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1968).
70. 210 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Rapo].
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
(3) When, as here, the stipulation merely consents to the
fixing of a fee by the Industrial Judge, some appropriate evi-
dence must, nevertheless, be submitted to support the amount
of the fee ultimately awarded.7'
In Lee Engineering and Construction Co. v. Fellows,72 however,
the court stated that the application of a contingent percentage to the
total value of the award is not an appropriate method for fixing a fee in
workmen's compensation cases, in the absence of a stipulation or other
evidence. The court thereby indicated that the present practice of agree-
ing to a stipulated percentage to be applied against the dollar recovery
was acceptable.
Attorneys who appear as expert witnesses in hearings involving
reasonable value of attorney's fees are not entitled to expert-witness fees
for their appearance.73
Once attorney's fees have been awarded, they bear interest from the
date so ordered.74
Attorney's fees are also assessable aganist the employer and car-
rier in enforcement proceedings7 5 and in the appellate review of final
orders but not in interlocutory proceedings. In the latter case, attorney's
fees must be held in abeyance pending disposition of the merits of the
claim.78
XIII. WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
During the period surveyed, only one opinion was filed regarding the
doctrine of waiver and estoppel. In Divito v. Fuller Brush Co.," the
doctrine was utilized to estop an employer from questioning the payment
of a medical bill to a treating doctor. The employer knew from the
beginning that the claimant was receiving treatment from the doctor, was
dissatisfied with the employer-selected doctor, and had returned to work
shortly after the accident with no permanent disability.
XIV. PENALTIES
The penalty provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act 78 were
held to apply to a lump-sum, wash-out settlement in Brantley v. ADH
71. Id. at 447.
72. 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Lee Engineering]. The Rapo and
Lee Engineering cases apparently overruled the court's finding in Robinette v. E.R. Jahna
Indus., Inc., 208 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1968), wherein the court approved a stipulation by the
parties that the attorney's fees could be set by the deputy without benefit of testimony.
73. Lee Engin. & Constr. Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968); Robert & Co.
Assoc. v. Zabawczuk, 200 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1967).
74. Mander v. Concreform Co., 212 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1968); Stone v. Jeffre, 208 So.2d
827 (Fla. 1968).
75. McCormick v. Messink, 208 So.2d 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
76. Honeywell, Inc. v. Haley, 216 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1968).
77. 217 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1968).
78. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(6) (1967).
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Building Contractors, Inc.79 The 20-percent penalty was limited however
to the money benefits or compensation benefits and was held not to be
applicable to medical benefits.
XV. PROCEDURE
Pursuant to statute, 0 claims for compensation may be filed with the
Florida Industrial Commission at its office in Tallahassee at any time
after the first seven days of disability following an injury or at any time
after death. In Pinellas Towers, Inc. v. Osborne,"' a claim was filed within
the seven-day waiting period. The employer sought to have the claim
voided in that it was filed only four days after the injury. In affirming
the order of the Commission which found the claim to be valid, it was
held that one of the functions of the seven-day waiting period is to give
the employer an opportunity to voluntarily provide the injured employee
with medical care and attention and to voluntarily pay to the injured
employee temporary, total disability, compensation benefits. However,
where an employer advises the injured employee within the seven day
waiting period that it does not have workmen's compensation insurance
coverage and that the injured employee will have to pay all medical
expenses incurred as a result of the compensable injury, the employer
has, in effect, declined to voluntarily accept the claim. The injured em-
ployee is thereby entitled to immediately file a claim with the Florida
Industrial Commission. The seven-day waiting period was also found to
be procedural rather than jurisdictional with no showing of prejudice by
any procedural error in the filing of the claim four days after injury."2
Although the burden of proof rests upon the injured workman to
show causal relationship between his injury and accident, that burden
may be met through lay testimony. In Martin v. Coral Sea Phillips 66,83
a workman was injured when a car fell on him while he was installing a
transmission. His injury was initially diagnosed as fractured ribs and
contusions. He received medical care from a physician who obtained no
history of any other injury. The workman subsequently alleged that he
had sustained a back injury as a result of the accident. This allegation
was denied by the treating physician. The trial judge found the back
injury to be related to the accident, but his award was reversed by the
full Commission which found there was no competent, substantial ev-
idence to show that the claimant's back condition was causally related
to his industrial accident. In granting certiorari and reinstating the trial
judge's award, the supreme court held that there was testimony in the
79. 215 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1968).
80. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(1) (1967).
81. 215 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1968).
82. Id. at 736.
83. 216 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1968).
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record of lay, or nonmedical, witnesses corroborative of claimant's testi-
mony that his back trouble resulted from his accident."
In Fisher v. Carroll Daniel Fisher Construction Co.,"8 the burden of
proof regarding causal relationship was held to have shifted to the em-
ployer where the medical evidence was of neutral quality and did not
conclusively prove or disprove causal relationship. In that case, the
injured workman had sustained a back injury for which he underwent
several surgical procedures. Following the last surgical procedure, the
treating physician found the workman was becoming somewhat bizarre
and irrational. He was readmitted to a hospital for a change of his body
cast and while there suffered a convulsion which caused fractures of the
dorsal and lumbar vertebrae. The uncontradicted evidence was that the
workman had no prior history of either seizures or prior back difficulties
and that since the injury to his back he had been subjected to three
radical operations, prolonged hospitalization, and prolonged periods
in body casts. Boils and abscesses developed as a result of the plaster
body jackets and the prolonged bed rest. The evidence further disclosed
the workman to have been in intense pain, and there was no evidence of
an intervening accident. In reversing the Commission's determination
that the seizure should be apportioned out of the award for lack of
causal relationship, the supreme court stated:
The fact of a serious injury is conclusively shown and the
above mentioned evidence presented a sufficiently logical ex-
planation of causal relationship of the seizures to the original
accident and injury so as to require the Employer-carrier,
who seeks to defeat recovery, to show that another cause of the
injury is more logical and consonant with reason.8
The case was remanded to the trial judge for further proceedings. 7
The utilization of a recorded statement taken from the claimant
shortly after his injury in order to impeach him was held to be proper
in United Sand & Material Corp. v. Florida Industrial Commission.s8
In that case, the claimant had sustained a heart attack. After an inter-
view with the carrier's adjuster, the carrier refused to accept the heart
attack as compensable. The trial judge denied the use of the recorded
84. Id. at 10.
85. 212 So,2d 289 (Fla. 1968).
86. Id. at 292.
87. In Zolobosky v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 207 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1968), a remand
was declined by the court, which held that the burden shifted to the employer and carrier
to refute a denial by claimant's counsel that a third-party claim had been instituted on an
alleged new injury resulting from medical care. The court found that this particular issue
was not of sufficient import to warrant remand for further questioning.
88. 201 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1967). The opinion of the court in this case was not unanimous
and there was a lengthy dissenting opinion wherein it was agreed that although FLA. STAT.
§ 92.33 (1967) did not apply to workmen's compensation proceedings, the policy of that
section should be applied to workmen's compensation proceedings. This would prevent the
unfair use of written statements of an injured party without affording him a chance to
properly examine such statements and to protect himself against any errors made therein.
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statement to impeach the claimant's testimony given at trial that he had
performed work not routine to his duties which involved unusual strain
and exertion. The cause was remanded in order to give the carrier the
opportunity to use the transcribed notes for purposes of cross-examina-
tion.
The importance of stipulations was again emphasized in Pennsyl-
vania National Insurance Group v. Mel. 9 There, the claimant and his
attorney entered into a stipulation calling for payment of his compensa-
tion in a lump sum and releasing the employer from further responsibility
to him, except for medical care. Subsequently, through new counsel, he
attempted to set aside an order effectuating the stipulation. The record
in this case disclosed that the claimant was fully familiar with the fact
that he was effectuating a final settlement at the time that the stipulation
was presented to the trial judge for approval. The motion to set aside
the stipulation was denied; it was found that there was a waiver which
complied with clause 3 of rule 1 of the rules of procedure adopted by the
Florida Industrial Commission in workmen's compensation cases.
Great weight is accorded in the recitals and findings of judges of
industrial claims concerning statements and stipulations of counsel. How-
ever, the admission into evidence of a medical report of a Commission-
appointed physician, through stipulation of the parties, was held not to
be a waiver of the right of cross-examination or an agreement that the
report would be accepted without question. 0
The granting of an insolvency petition under Florida Industrial
Commission rule 6 (c) to an indigent claimant seeking review of an order
of a judge of industrial claims was contested in Honeywell, Inc. v. Haley."
In that case, the employer and carrier contended that the questioned rule
exceeded the authority of the Commission as confirmed by the legislature
and that the rule operated to deprive employers and carriers of due
process or equal protection of the law. In noting that the rule had been
in existence for more than 25 years, the court stated:
In any case, the relationship of Rule 6(c) to the legislative
authority evidenced by Section 440.29(2), coupled with the
acquiescent attitude of the Legislature toward this rule since
its implementation, leads us to conclude the promulgation of
Rule 6(c) by the Florida Industrial Commission constituted
a proper and constitutional exercise of power conferred by the
Legislature. 2
In those instances where there are inadequate findings of fact or
there is insufficient evidence on a material issue to determine that issue,
the procedure adopted by our court has been to remand the case back to
89. 199 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1967).
90. North West Trailer Sales v. McCann, 217 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1968).
91. 216 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1968).
92. Id. at 747.
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the trial judge. 3 For example, in Paul v. Toddle House Corp.,94 the
claimant died during pendency of the appellate proceedings. In noting
that an administrator of the claimant's estate had been substituted, the
court returned the matter to the full Commission and stated that it may
then be remanded to the deputy commissioner (judge of industrial
claims) to determine the proper recipient of the proceeds of the award.
XVI. THIRD PARTIES AND SUBROGATION
The exclusive remedy doctrine of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, which limits recovery of injured employees to workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, was applied in Hart v. National Airlines, Inc. 5 In that
case, the claimant was engaged in loading mail pursuant to a contract
existing between the claimant's employer and the defendant. The injury
was occasioned by an employee of the defendant. In affirming a summary
judgment for the defendant, the third district held that the common
employment doctrine was applicable and that the claimant's exclusive
remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The owner and lessor of a truck was held to be a third party in
Hunt v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc.." In that case, the injury occurred
when an employee of the lessee fell through the rotted truck floor.
In Stevens v. International Builders of Florida, Inc.,97 a subcon-
tractor was injured due to the negligence of an employee of the general
contractor. The subcontractor was found to be entitled to maintain a
third-party action since the subcontractor was not an employee and was
therefore not entitled to receive compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
A truck driver who sustained injury while delivering a crate to a
customer due to the negligence of the customer's employees in unload-
ing the crate was able to maintain a third-party action against the
customer."8 It was held that there was no employment contract either
expressed or implied existing between the truck driver and the customer.
The absolute discharge of all liability of an employer or its work-
men's compensation insurance carrier through joint petitions" does not
deprive the employer or carrier of its subrogated interest in third-party
law suits.1°0
93. See Cooper v. Waverly Growers Co-Op., 216 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1968) (lack of suffi-
cient evidence on material issue required remand); Boren v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 212
So.2d 8 (Fla. 1968) (where inadequate findings of fact caused remand).
94. 206 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1968).
95. Hart v. National Airlines, Inc., 217 So.2d 900 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
96. 216 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1968). The supreme court opinion summarized its prior de-
cisions regarding third parties and likened the truck owner to a materialman.
97. 207 So.2d 287 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
98. Acme Elec., Inc. v. Travis, 218 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
99. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(10) (1967). This section permits complete releases of workmen's
compensation benefits by payment of benefits in a lump sum, the settlement having become
known as a "wash-out settlement."
100. Maschick v. General Accident Group, 214 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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XVII. ADDITIONAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST
In McCormick v. Messink,101 an injured workman was collecting
permanent, partial disability benefits when he fell as a result of that
permanent disability. Pursuant to a hearing, an order was entered finding
the workman to again be temporarily and totally disabled. The order
provided for resumption of the permanent disability payments once
temporary, total disability terminated. Jurisdiction was retained for the
purpose of determining the maximum medical recovery date. Subse-
quently, the treating physician determined that the injured workman had
again reached maximum medical recovery, at which time the workmen's
compensation insurance carrier voluntarily terminated temporary, total
disability benefits and resumed payment of compensation for permanent
disability. The injured workman sought enforcement of the award of
temporary, total disability in the circuit court. The circuit court's en-
forcement of the temporary, total disability order was affirmed; the
district court of appeal held that the deputy commissioner (judge of
industrial claims) was the only one who could modify his order and
determine the maximum medical recovery date.'
Enforcement of an order was declined, however, where the order
provided for payment of compensation conditioned on the claimant's
undergoing a spinal fusion. The burden was on the claimant in the en-
forcement proceedings to show the condition precedent had occurred,
that he had in fact undergone such an operation, before he was entitled
to recover under the award.l'0
XVIII. CONCLUSION
During the period surveyed, the doctrine of apportionment and
applicability of the Special Disability Fund have had the most significant
judicial interpretations. There has also been a reduction in the number
of petitions for writ of certiorari granted by the supreme court as com-
pared to the total of petitions filed.
Our supreme court's concern over the time lag and delays from the
time of injury until the time of final disposition has been reflected in
several decisions during this surveyed period.0 4
101. 208 So.2d 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
102. Id. at 116.
103. Maldonado v. Keller Metal Prod., 203 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1967).
104. Sierra v. Deauville Operating Co., 213 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1968). See Clenney v.
Walker Hauling Co., 217 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1968) (time delay stated to be unconscionable);
Allison Dev. Inc. v. Rudasill, 202 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1967) (time delay was characterized as a
"sad commentary").
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